Condorcet winner configurations in the facility location problem

J. Hajduková
Abstract:

We consider the problem of locating a fixed number of facilities along a line to serve $n$ players. We model this problem as a cooperative game and assume that any locational configuration can be eventually disrupted through a strict majority of players voting for an alternative configuration. A solution of such a voting location problem is called a Condorcet winner configuration. In this paper we state three necessary and one sufficient condition for a configuration to be a Condorcet winner. Consequently, we propose a fast algorithm, which enables us to verify whether a given configuration is a Condorcet winner, and can be efficiently used also for computing the (potentially empty) set of all Condorcet winner configurations.

Contact the authors: jana.hajdukova@upjs.sk

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